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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction
over this Petition for Review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
S 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1953, as amended),
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

Industrial

Commission

of

Utah

(hereinafter

"Commission") erroneously interpret or apply the law?

If it has,

it constitutes grounds under Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16(4)(d)
to grant relief sought and this court shall accord no deference to
the

Commission's

Attorney,

818

determination.

P.2d

23

(Utah

Tolman v. Salt
App.

1991)

Lake County

The

appellant,

(hereinafter "Sheikh") expressly noted in opening arguments and
closing arguments the appropriate standards and guidelines under
the

law

concerning

intent

to

discriminate

and

constructive

discharge.
2.

Even if the Commission correctly interpreted and applied

the law, was the Commission's action based upon a determination
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-

16(4)(g), this court shall grant relief if the Commissions action
was based upon a determination of fact not supported by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record and if it substantially
prejudiced Sheikh. To challenge those finding Sheikh must marshall
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the

supporting

contradictory

facts,
evidence,

and
the

in

light

findings

of
are

the
not

conflicting

or

supported

by

substantial evidence. Nelson v. Department of Employment Security,

801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990) Substantial evidence is more than a
mere "scintilla" of evidence though it something less than the
weight of the evidence.

It is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P 2d. 63 (Utah App.
1989).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.2d. 1199 (D Utah
1986), Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d. 1536 (11th Cir.
1987), Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d. 553 (10th Cir.
1981), McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 Sup. Ct. 1817 (U.S.
1973).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

The

law

regarding

discrimination

requires

that

the

employer articulate legitimate reasons for the disparate treatment
(once the person has been identified of falling within a protected
class, i.e. pregnancy); then the employee has the obligation of
demonstrating that the articulated reasons are a sham and are not
valid.

The Commission and the Administrative Law Judge failed to

correctly apply this last step of the requirement for establishing
discrimination

in

that

they made

no

findings

regarding

the

substantial amount of evidence demonstrating that the articulated
reason for the aberrant schedule given to Sheikh upon her return
from maternity leave, ie, training of a new hire named Russell, was
a sham.

The evidence clearly establishes that the training of

Russell did not account for the intolerable nature of the schedule,
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thus, Sheikh met her burden of demonstrating that the articulated
reason was a sham and under the law, judgment should have been
awarded to Sheikh•
In regard to constructive discharge, the Commission and the
Administrative Law Judge failed to give weight to the fact that no
effort had been made by the employer to give assurances of a change
in the schedule or to alleviate the onerous nature of the schedule.
Thus they failed to apply the law correctly.
POINT II:

The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission made

determinations of fact and conclusions that were not based on
substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole.
In regard to discrimination, substantial and

significant

evidence was provided by Sheikh demonstrating that the articulated
reason for the aberrant schedule, the training of the new hire
Russell, was a sham.

In fact there was no evidence much less

substantial evidence offered at all by the State to explain why
prior to Sheikh' s return from maternity leave and subsequent to her
termination there had never been anyone placed on a "Sheikh" type
of schedule despite the fact that Russell was in training both two
or more weeks prior to Sheikh's return and two weeks after Sheikh's
termination.

In regard to constructive discharge, there was no

evidence whatsoever much less substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that the schedule was not "intolerable" and there was
virtually no evidence to demonstrate that Sheikh would have rotated
into a more tolerable schedule after three weeks. To the contrary,
the substantial evidence in this regard was that the schedule had
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never operated on the rotational basis as planned and that Sheikh
had no reasonable expectation that it would be and that no
assurances were given to her or efforts to ameliorate the situation
once the State knew of the problem despite the fact that Sheikh
stayed for another two weeks after giving her notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
In

addressing

Petitioner/Appellant,

the

issues

Sandra

raised

Sheikh, will

by
be

this
referred

Appeal,
to as

"Sheikh" and Respondent/Appellee, State of Utah/Utah Department of
Public Safety will be referred to as "State" or "Department of
Public Safety"
Sheikh filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of Utah
based

on

a

claim

of

sex

discrimination

because

of

pregnancy/maternity and pregnancy related matters and constructive
discharge.

The matter was heard before the Honorable Benjamin A.

Sims, Administrative Law Judge, and the Administrative Law Judge
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (hereinafter
"ALJ Order") on September 9, 1993. A true and correct copy of the
ALJ Order is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.

Sheikh then

filed a motion for review before the Industrial Commission.

On

August 25, 1994, the Industrial Commission of Utah, (hereinafter
the

"Commission") issued

an Order Denying Motion

(hereinafter "Review Order").

for Review

A true and correct copy of the

Review Order is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The ALJ Order denied
and dismissed Sheikh's claim with prejudice.
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The Review Order

adopted the Findings of Fact set forth in the ALJ Order and again
denied Sheikh's motion and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge
decision.
There was no question in the ALJ Order or the Review Motion as
to the fact that Sheikh fell within a protected class of persons
under Utah Law and that upon her return from maternity leave, (she
worked as a dispatcher in the Price Department of Public Safety)
she was given a very difficult, rigorous and unusual schedule of
shifts. The questions as more fully set forth in the Statement of
Issues and Argument is whether or not the State gave a legitimate
reason for the disparate treatment of Sheikh upon her return from
maternity leave and whether or not Sheikh, by voluntarily resigning
her position, was constructively discharged.
STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL1
1.

The

Petitioner/Appellant,

hereinafter

"Sheikh", was

employed by the Carbon County Sheriff's Office in April, 1980.
(Tran.

p.

113)

In

August,

1988,

the

Sheriff's

Department

consolidated with the Utah Highway Patrol Office which was then
called the Department of Public Safety.

(Tran. p. 113) Sheikh was

employed as a dispatcher in the combined time that she was at the
Carbon County Sheriff's Office and after the consolidation with the
Department of Public Safety.

(Tran. p. 133)

She left the

employment of the Department of Public Safety on May 24, 1990.
(Tran. p. 113)

1
The citation to the transcript from the hearing on August 27, 1993 are set forth after each fact
Statement below. Citations to the transcript will not be recited again in the Argument when the facts are
stated.
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2.

At the time Sheikh left the employment of the Department

of Public Safety (hereinafter "State") she was earning $638.40 byweekly and was receiving State paid employment benefits in the
amount of $186.36 by-weekly (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, September 9, 1993, hereinafter "ALJ Order", Finding No.
1).
3.

When the consolidation took place in approximately 1988,

Nancy Allred (aka Nancy Hansen) became the manager of the dispatch
center.
4.

(Tran. p. 7)
Lisa Shook was the direct superior of Sheikh and held the

position of shift supervisor.

(Tran. p. 8) When Lisa Shook became

the shift supervisor, Nancy Allred gave Shook the assignment of
doing the scheduling (Tran. p. 8), however, scheduling was within
the scope of duties of Allred and Allred had the final authority
and decisions on schedules, (Tran. pp. 9, 240), and Shook discussed
scheduling almost daily with Allred.
5.

(Tran. p. 238)

Preparation of the schedules was difficult and the Price

dispatch center had little or no personnel resource slack.

ALJ

Order, Finding No. 9; (Tran. p. 49, 235,238 239)
6.

Sheikh learned she was pregnant in Fall of 1989 and

informed Lisa Shook.

(Tran. p. 115)

On January 7, 1990, Sheikh

gave notice to Allred that she expected to take maternity leave
commencing on February 14, 1990. (Tran. p. 114)

Subsequently,

Sheikh learned that her due date had changed and she gave a new
written notice to Allred on about February 27, 1990 stating that
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her maternity day had changed to approximately March 8, 1990.
(Tran. p. 114)
7.

Nancy Allred was upset that Sheikh had told Shook of her

pregnancy before telling Allred (Tran, p. 116, 294) and also was
upset when Sheikh changed her due date and Allred expressed that
this would necessitate rescheduling again.

(Tran. p. 117, 294)

While Sheikh was on maternity leave, a dispatcher named Patty quit
on approximately March 16, 1990.
8.

(Tran. p. 218)

Shook was a loyal employee and obeyed orders from Allred.

(Tran. p. 12)
9.

Prior to February 22, 1990, the schedule had rotated to

some degree erratically and approximately every two weeks.

(Tran.

pp. 26, 30-32))
10.

John Kelly, a fellow employee, prepared a suggested new

schedule which would theoretically provide that each dispatcher
would work a certain shift for three weeks and then rotate to a new
shift.
11.

(Tran. p. 24)
It was desirable to have three days off in between a

major shift change to allow the person to adjust to a new schedule.
(Tran. pp. 20-21)
12.

Short-changes or double-backs refer to working a shift

and then returning to another shift within less than 8 or 9 hours.
These short-changes or double-backs are undesirable and were not
deliberately scheduled;

rather, they were necessitated on certain

occasions due to people calling in sick or taking vacation, ie.
unplanned events.

(Tran. pp. 21, 28, 29, 63)
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13.

The schedule prepared on or around February 22, 1990 was

discussed with Sheikh prior to her leaving on maternity leave and
she was informed that pursuant to the schedule she would be working
a swing-shift (ie., 3 pm to 11 pm) for three weeks following her
return from maternity leave.
14.

(Tran. pp. 121- 154, 75)

A new dispatcher named Russell was hired and went into

training as a dispatcher.
for 6 to 8 weeks.

It is normal for dispatchers to train

(Tran. pp. 12, 199) Russell was in training for

approximately 3 weeks prior to Sheikh's return on May 4, 1990 and
for approximately 1 to 2 weeks after Sheikh's termination on May
24, 1990. (Tran. pp. 34, 65, 213)
15.

A new trainee must have an experienced dispatcher with

the trainee at all times until the trainee has been sufficiently
trained and is not allowed to work a shift alone.

(Tran. pp. 225,

247, 288)
16.

Shortly before Sheikh returned from her maternity leave,

Shook called Sheikh at home and explained that adjustments had been
made to Sheikh's schedule and that she would not be returning to
straight afternoon shifts for three weeks.
17.

(Tran pp. 245-248)

Shook said something to the effect when she called Sheikh

that she had "bad" news and that Sheikh wasn't going to like the
schedule, (Tran. p. 125) Shook recognized that she would not want
to work it.
18.

(Tran. pp. 261, 268)

Allred acknowledged in her testimony that scheduling a

dispatcher with small children at home was more difficult because
it was not as easy for them to find babysitters and such on short

-9-

notice or in the middle of the night.
expressed

on

various

occasions

dispatchers with small children.
19.

(Tran. p. 10)

the difficulty

of

Allred

scheduling

(Tran. p. 118)

Maternity leave where a person is generally gone for 1 to

2 months, made scheduling difficult during that person's absence.
(Tran. p. 10)
20.

Prior to Sheikh's maternity leave, it had only been

necessary for Allred to schedule one other maternity leave which
was Shook's and Shook was on a fixed schedule, that is she always
worked afternoon shifts, and did not rotate as did the other
dispatchers. (ALJ Order Finding No. 7;
21.

Tran. pp. 143-144)

Sheikh returned to work following her maternity leave on

Friday May 4, 1990. The schedule that was set for her upon return
for the next three weeks was as follows: Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00
am to 1:00 pm (CPR Training), and 11:00 pm to 7:00 am;
May 5, 1990 11:00 pm to 7:00 am;
7:00 am;

Saturday,

Sunday, May 6, 1990, 11:00 pm to

Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 pm to 12:00 midnight;

Tuesday, May 8, 1990 - off;

Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off;

Thursday, May 10, 1990 - noon to 8:00 pm;
3:00 pm to 11:30 pm;

Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 pm to 7:00 am;

Sunday May 13, 1990 - 11:00 pm to 7:00 am;
4:00 pm to midnight;
16, 1990 - off;

Friday, May 11, 1990 -

Monday, May 14, 1990 -

Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May

Thursday, May 17, 1990 - 8:00 am to 4:00 pm;

Friday, May 18, 1990 9:00 am to 5:00 pm;
11:00 pm to 7:00 am;

Saturday, May 19, 1990

Sunday, May 20, 1990- 11:00 pm to 7:00 am;

Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 pm to 1:00 am; Tuesday, May 22, 1990 -10-

off;

Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off;

8:00 am to 4:00 pm.
129)

Thursday, May 24, 1990 -

(ALJ Order, Finding No. 12;

Tran. pp. 127-

The schedule included a short-change each week and a change

of between three different shifts during each of the three weeks.

22.

Prior to Sheikh's return, during the approximate 3 weeks

while Russell was training, no one was given the schedule which
Sheikh was given upon her return, herein
Schedule"

after the

"Sheikh

(Tran. pp. 33-34) Following Sheikh's termination or at

least the 4 days following while Russell was still training, no one
was given the Sheikh Schedule.

(Tran. p. 212) No one had in the

two years since consolidation been given a schedule or worked a
schedule like the Sheikh schedule and no one after was given such
a schedule.
23.

(Tran. pp. 90, 175-178, 130-131, 132)

The Sheikh schedule was a "pre-planned" schedule, rather,

it was not a last minute change on occasion to accommodate on
unplanned event such as a sick call in.
24.
the

(Tran. p. 212)

The schedules in all the time that Allred had been with

State, following

the consolidation, had never worked as

planned, ie., there were last minute changes that had to be made to
accommodate an unexpected or unplanned event such as a sick call,
and "rotation" was not a " given", ie., it did not always occur.
(Tran. pp. 26, 27, 29, 69, 74)
25.

Sheikh could not determine what her schedule would have

been had she remained with the Department after May 24, 1990 and
had been given no reason to think there would be in fact she
-11-

believed there would be no relief because Allred would not change
the Sheikh schedule. (Tran. p. 129, 140, 155, 156)
26.

Allred acknowledged that Sheikh could not have known what

shift she would be working after May 24, 1990.
27.

(Tran. p. 234)

Allred could not state what Sheikh's schedule would have

been had Sheikh remained with the Department after May 24, 1990
(Tran. pp. 129, 140, 155, 156)
28.

Upon Sheikh's resignation, the stated reason on the

resignation form was the rotational schedule.

Neither Allred or

Shook gave any assurances that the schedule would change and become
more tolerable if Sheikh could wait until the end of the 3 weeks
period.

(Tran. p. 90) Allred made no effort to try and convince

Sheikh to stay with the Department despite her 10 1/2 years of
service and despite that she was considered a good employee.
(Tran. p. 140, 155, 156)
29.
1990.

Shook learned of Sheikh's resignation on about May 10,

(Tran. p. 252)

Shook did not discuss Sheikh's resignation

or offer to work with her or assist her in obtaining a more
tolerable schedule, nor did she assure her that she would not be on
the schedule following May 24, 1990 and when asked "why" she said
"I don't know".
30.

(Tran. p. 254)

A pre-planned rotational schedule does not occur as

planned when someone needs even 1 day off.
schedule.
31.

It changes the whole

(Tran. p. 28)
A.J.'s

(temporary

personnel)

(rather

than

regular

dispatchers) were used to fill in during Russell's training while
-12-

Sheikh was still on maternity leave and A.J. 's were used to fill in
following Sheikh's departure on May 24, 1990 while Russell was
still training even though a new person named Maria had been hired
to take Sheikh's place.
32.

(Tran. pp. 33, 34, 207)

The availability or unavailability of A.J.'s or money to

pay A.J.'s was not a factor taken into consideration in the
preparation of the Sheikh schedule.
33.

(Tran. p. 231, 252, 266)

No attempt was made to schedule A.J.'s to alleviate the

Sheikh schedule and Allred and Shook didn't know or check to see if
these was money available for A.J.'s (Tran. p. 207, 231)
34.

Sheikh's

employment

history

and

performance

were

satisfactory, on a written evaluation, in the various categories,
Sheikh received either 4 or 5 out of a possible 1-5 markings, she
received no written reprimands from the time Allred became the
supervisor, shortly after the consolidation, and prior to Sheikh's
departure on May 24, 1990 and Allred did not give any oral
criticism during that time.
35.

(Tran. pp. 36-38)

It is difficult to find people that will be dispatchers

in the Price area because there are not as many people looking for
the job and not as many qualified applicants; being the supervisor
and manager of the center is not an easy job, it is very stressful.
(Tran. p. 40)
36.

It was stressful and difficult to prepare schedules and

to deal with the continual changes that had to be made to the
schedules due to unplanned events.
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(Tran. 121, 136-137, 292)

37.

Shook and Allred discussed scheduling problems often.

(Tran. P. 238)
38.
worked

Sheikh had worked rotational shifts in the past and had
short-changes.

Sheikh

had

never

refused

particular rotational shift or a short-change.

to work

a

(Tran. pp. 121,

136-137, 292)
39.

It was difficult to adjust from one type of shift to

another such as from day shift to a graveyard and a two week
rotational was found not to be adequate in giving people time to
adjust to the new schedule.
put into place.
40.

That is why a 3 week rotational was

(Tran. p. 56)

From December 23, 1989 through May 1990 the double-backs

worked by dispatchers were Marty-4, Lisa-2, Patty-1, Leah-4, John1, Diane-2, Russell-1 and Sandra-0.
41.

Russell was put on the day and or afternoon shifts for

her training.
42.

(Tran. p. 68)

(Tran. p. 72)

Schedules were not deliberately set to include double-

backs or moving major changes to other shifts.
43.

(Tran. p. 77)

Sheikh, after being told what the schedule would be upon

her return, that is afternoon shifts for 3 weeks, Sheikh did not
criticize the schedule and did not make a request for a change.
(Tran. p. 121)
44.

Typically if double-backs or erratic changes in shifts

were included within the schedule it was not a "pre-planned"

schedule, rather it was a result of unforseen and unplanned events.
(Tran. p. 102)
-14-

45.

The persons who had worked double-backs as set forth in

fact No. 37 above over an approximate 5 month period had not been
pre-scheduled for those double-backs.
46.

(Tran. p. 104)

Sheikh did not have a pattern of calling in sick on

graveyard shifts prior to her return from maternity leave.

(Tran.

p. 110)
47.

Allred indicated that she was upset with Sheikh when she

found out Sheikh was pregnant and that Sheikh had told Shook about
it first and not told Allred first.
48.

(Tran. p. 116)

Until Sheikh's return from maternity leave, she had never

in all of the years working as a dispatcher, approximately 10, been
given a schedule that contained three different shift and a doubleback each week for a period of three weeks.
49.

(Tran.

p. 123)

Sheikh was not aware of anyone in the department in the

2 years following consolidation that had been pre-scheduled ahead
to work as many changes as were set out in the Sheikh schedule.
(Tran. pp. 130-132)
50.

Sheikh found the Sheikh schedule intolerable, it affected

her physically and mentally, she was under a tremendous amount of
stress, she could not establish an eating or sleeping pattern, she
was unable to spend time with her family, and she was concerned for
the safety of the Officers because of the stress and fatigue.
(Tran. pp. 130 132, 136, 290, 291)
51.

Sheikh believed that no one, not even a person who was

physically well, could work such a schedule and do a good job.
(Tran. p. 131)
-15-

52.

Sheikh felt that she was forced to resign because no one

gave her any assurances that the schedule would not continue or
that some other bad schedule would not be given to her and no one
made any changes to alleviate it through the use of A.J.'s or
otherwise.
53.

(Tran. p. 131)

Sheikh gave notice on May 10, 1990 and did not quit until

May 24, 1990, ie. two weeks notice, because she felt she owed it to
the State since she had worked for them for so long.

(Tran. p.

133)
54.

Sheikh was not adverse to a "rotating schedule", she had

worked rotating schedules in the past, rather, the rotation to
which she objected in her termination notice was rotating from
shift to shift within 1 week including double-backs.
136, 292)

(Tran. pp.

Sheikh had never refused to work any particular shift.

(Tran. p. 121)
55.
and

Sheikh was concerned about her health and mental state

stress and, although

her mother would

be available

for

babysitting during erratic shifts, she felt it was undesirable to
impose upon her mother.
56.

(Tran. p. 174)

Everyone including Sheikh complained frequently about the

schedules.

(Tran. p. 286) Due to complaints, John Kelly proposed

the new 3 week rotation to alleviate some problems.

(Tran. p. 286)

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED OR APPLIED
THE LAW CONCERNING DISCRIMINATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE
-16-

A.

DISCRIMINATION

The Commission erroneously interpreted or applied the law
regarding discrimination because of pregnancy.
Utah Code Annotated § 34-35-6 states:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a)(i)for an employer to. . .discriminated in
matter of. . .conditions of employment against any
person otherwise qualified, because of
pregnancy,
childbirth,
or
pregnancy-related
conditions . . .
The ALJ Order correctly states the basic legal standard for
establishing discrimination, that the employee has the "initial
burden to establish a prima facia showing of the employerfs
discrimination. Thereafter the burden of production shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for the conduct in question.

If the employer succeeds, the burden

of production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons
articulated

by

discrimination."

the

employer

were

mere

pretext

for

the

(ALJ Order p.6).

Case law on this issue demonstrates that an employee must
rebut

"articulated

legitimate

reasons"

for

the

seemingly

discriminatory action. Utah, in Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc.
639 F.2d. 1199 (D. Utah 1986) adopted the standard set forth by the
10th Circuit in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 93 S. Ct.
1817 (U.S. 1973).

As stated in McDonnell Douglas " . . . direct

evidence of discriminatory intent is unlikely to arise in the
Plaintiff's case."

Discrimination as a motivation for one's

actions is seldom admitted and is often cloaked "in thin robes of
what the law deems legitimate."

. . . For that reason, evidence of
-17-

discrimination in most contexts will be indirect or circumstantial.
"The United States Supreme Court recognized early on the problems
of proof extant in such an inquiry."

Id. (Emphasis added). The

McDonnell Douglas case gave a number of examples of conduct showing
an intent and motive for discriminatory treatment. One such factor
is procedural irregularities, although there are numerous other
types of circumstantial evidence that also cannot be explained
outside of discriminatory intent. In Sheikh's situation, there are
numerous examples, including procedural irregularities, that cannot
be explained outside of discriminatory intent, which are discussed
in more detail in Point II below.
Commission

apparently

In the Sheikh case, the

misinterpreted

regarding evidence of discrimination.
statements made in the ALJ Order:

or

misapplied

the

law

This is evident by the

"There was no indication in

testimony at the hearing that the employer ever singled out the
charging party simply because she was pregnant or had been pregnant
. . . "

(ALJ Order p. 6);

"there was no evidence that the

dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination against
any employee prior to the allegations of this current complaint."
(ALJ Order, Finding # 16, p. 4). These statements indicate that
the Administrative Law Judge was looking for direct evidence of
discrimination rather than appropriately applying or interpreting
the standard in Bowen and McDonnell Douglas, that is, that one must
look at the circumstantial evidence and see through "robes" of
legitimacy that are offered by the employer as explanations for its
conduct.
-18-

In addition to the actual findings of the Administrative Law
Judge, the misinterpretation or misapplication of the law is
evident

by

the

lack

of

findings

and

conclusions

by

the

Administrative Law Judge. For instance, in the "Legal Discussion11
of the ALJ Order, it states "The employer articulated legitimate
reasons for the schedule . . . " (ALJ Order, p. 6)

The Discussion

and Findings did not, however, include the fact that Sheikh
presented substantial evidence (see discussion in Point II below)
to rebut those "legitimate articulated reasons".

Again in the

"Conclusions of Law" of the ALJ Order, it states "In any event,
assuming that the employee did make a prima facia

[sic] the

employer articulated legitimate reasons why the charging party's
schedule was difficult and therefore it is concluded that the
Charging Party cannot prevail." (ALJ Order, p. 7, fl 1)

There is

nothing in that conclusion or the testimony that addresses Sheikh's
rebuttal of those "articulated legitimate reasons".
Thus, it is apparent that the Judge stopped short of applying
the entire standard, which is that Sheikh was obligated to rebut
seemingly legitimate reasons put forth by the State. She did rebut
those reasons as more fully set forth in Point II below.

Nulf v.

International Paper Company» 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1981) states
that if the actions by an employer are not satisfactorily explained
then it is more likely than not that such actions were based on
discriminatory criteria.
related

matters

are

That is, if the pregnancy, or pregnancy

followed

by

disparate

treatment

and/or

termination of employment, there is an inference that there was a
-19-

discriminatory

motive

unless

there

is

a

very

satisfactory

explanation for the conduct of which is complained. Id.
As more fully set forth in Point II below, the State attempted
to legitimize its conduct by explaining that Sheikh had been given
the schedule she was given simply because there was a rotational
schedule and a new employee was training, and it necessitated
moving the person scheduled for the swing shift (for which Sheikh
was scheduled) into the intolerable schedule.

As more fully set

forth below, the facts show clearly that the State had never, under
any

circumstances

including

training

or

other

difficulties,

scheduled someone to work the type of schedule for which Sheikh was
scheduled, that Russell, the person in training, was in training
prior to Sheikh's return to work and the State was as short-handed
then as after Sheikh's return and no one had been asked to work
that schedule, and that for at least one week following Sheikh's
termination, Russell was still training and the State was as shorthanded as before and no one was asked to work the same schedule as
Sheikh during this time period.2
were

legitimate

reasons

for

Examples of cases where there
conduct

which

appeared

to

be

discriminatory are found in Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d. 109
(D.C.

Cir. 1980).

In that case there was a falsification of

credentials and records by the employee, and a pattern of continual
dishonesty. That was considered a legitimate reason for discharge.

2
As set forth and cited In Point II below, the State could not testify at the hearing as to what
schedule existed beyond one week after Sandra Sheikh's termination date, that Is, the state witnesses could not
testify that anyone after that was ever asked to work the same schedule despite the fact that Russell was still
In training.
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In another case, Connors v. University of Tennessee Press, 558 F.
Supp. 38 (N.D. Tenn. 1982), a woman had taken a leave of absence
for pregnancy and then had requested an additional
absence.

leave of

The employer had shown dissatisfaction with the woman's

prior work, the woman had a short tenure at the job, she had a
record

of

past

absences

and

the

employer

had

the

need

to

permanently fill the position at that time. That was considered a
legitimate excuse for terminating the woman upon her taking a
second leave of absence.

The Court in Nulf also found that a

refusal to perform duties and insubordination was a sufficient
reason for discharge unless it was the discriminatory act of the
employer that induced the conduct of the employee complained of by
the employer.

None of these factors, as can be seen in the

transcript and as set forth in Point II below, are found to exist
in Sheikh's case. There was no unsatisfactory work performance; in
fact,

she

was

considered

a good

employee;

there

were

no

falsehoods, no insubordination, no reprimands and Sheikh had a long
tenure with the State.
fill

the

position.

Further, there was no need to permanently
Thus,

the

commission

misapplied

or

misinterpreted the law by failing to recognize any of the testimony
put on by Sheikh which demonstrated that the articulated (and
seemingly) legitimate reason, (Russell's training) was in fact a
sham and a cloak for discrimination.
B.

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

The Administrative Law Judge correctly stated that to show
constructive discharge "she must show that a reasonable person
-21-

would view the working conditions as intolerable.11

(ALJ Order p.

6) The test for constructive discharge in Utah as set forth by the
10th Circuit

is whether a reasonable person would

conditions intolerable.

find the

Daemi v. Churchfs Fried Chicken, 931

F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1991) Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th
Cir. 1983),

Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004

(10th Cir. 1990).
In a similar case, Garner v. Wal-Mart, 807 F.2d 1536 (11th
Cir. 1987), a woman department store manager took maternity leave
and upon her return she was not reinstated as a department head
manager, rather she was placed as a floater from department to
department.

The person who had filled her position during her

absence had been her subordinate before she left.

The employer

gave reasons for its actions such as that it needed to fill the
position at the time, that the employee who had been placed into
that position during the woman's absence had been doing a good job,
that the company had been gearing up for the Christmas season and
that the new employee was fully geared up and prepared for the
Christmas season, whereas the woman who had left on maternity leave
was not. The Court said that these reasons were a pretext and they
were not legitimate reasons. The Court determined that there were
other methods by which the employer could have integrated the
employee back into work and should have at least assured her that
it would work toward integrating her back into the managerial
position within a short period of time.

The employee, however,

quit the first day and the Court found she had not given the
-22-

employer a reasonable chance to remedy the situation and therefore
denied her claim. In the Sheikh case, the Administrative Law Judge
found ". . .no one told her that she would not have to work this
schedule indefinitely "

(ALJ Order, p. 5 f 20)

The Judge

apparently ignored this significant piece of evidence and therefore
it

appears

misinterpreted

constructive discharge.

or

misapplied

the

law

concerning

This evidence is significant in view of

the Garner v. Wal-Mart case because the Court there found that the
employer could have and should have, at the very least, assured the
woman that it would work to integrate her back into her position.
This indicates that there was some obligation on the part of the
State to at least give assurances to Sheikh that this schedule was
short-termed, just a temporary situation.

The Administrative Law

Judge apparently ignored the testimony of Sheikh that she did not
know if that schedule would last forever or if she would be given
other intolerable schedules forever in an effort to "punish" her
for making Allred and Shook1s life difficult by not only taking
maternity leave, but giving notice of one maternity leave date and
then changing it subsequently.

There is further indication that

the Administrative Law Judge also found that Sheikh did not express
to Shook that " . . . she could not or would not work the assigned
schedule . . .", that Allred, (the second level supervisor) " . .
. was not aware that the charging party was unhappy about the
schedule until May 10, 1990 . . . " and that Sheikh had it within
her power to ask others to trade shifts with her, thus having the
means within her control to modify the schedule herself.
-23-

(ALJ

Order, p. 4 ff 14, 15, p. 6)

The Judge failed to correctly apply

the law by requiring the State to give assurances to Sheikh or use
other alternatives to remedy the training situation.

The Judge

found that, had Sheikh waited through the three week period, that
her shift would have automatically rotated and changed to a more
tolerable one.

The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that

the schedule " . . . although difficult was not intolerable."3

(ALJ

Order, p. 7) The Administrative Law Judge obviously stopped short
of the complete application of the law based on the Garner v. WalMart cases and other cases cited therein, Implicitly, the issue of
constructive discharge, includes a consideration of whether the
employee gave the employer adequate opportunity to remedy the
situation before quitting and whether the employer gave assurances
as to the future.

The Administrative Law Judge made no findings

concerning whether Sheikh gave the State an adequate opportunity to
assure her as to future schedule or to remedy the schedule Sheikh
found intolerable. Obviously the Administrative Law Judge ignored
or took as insignificant the evidence that no one had told Sheikh
that she would not have to work the schedule indefinitely.

Also,

the Administrative Law Judge completely ignored the undisputed
testimony

that

resignation.

Sheikh

stayed

for

two

weeks

following

her

Even if Allred and Shook did not know or realize

before May 10, 1990 that Sheikh was extremely overwrought and
dissatisfied with the schedule and that she found it intolerable,
3
The Administrative Law Judge also found that John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee said that he
would have worked the schedule. (ALJ Order, p. 4, 1 13) If this was a basis for the finding that the schedule
was not intolerable, it was not a legitimate finding for the reasons set forth in Point II.
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they certainly knew two weeks before she left, the date she
resigned. During that time period they had adequate opportunity to
give Sheikh assurances or to actually remedy the schedule.

The

Judge made no findings on this issue which indicates a complete
misinterpretation or misapplication of the law on constructive
discharge.
Finally, the Court misinterpreted

or misapplied

the law

because it ignored the fact that the U.A.D.D. found that Sheikh had
been forced to resign which entitled her to unemployment benefits.
(Transcript, Opening Statement, p. 7)

This was presented to the

Judge at the hearing, the State objected.

The Administrative Law

Judge did not rule on the objection but did note the objection.
The Nulf case, a 10th Circuit case, allows the Court to consider
these other agency rulings in its determination and the Court
apparently ignored the 10th Circuit law in Nulf by not considering
the constructive discharge finding.

POINT II: THE COMMISSION'S
ACTION WAS
BASED UPON A
DETERMINATION OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
The Commission adopted the findings of the Administrative Law
Judge and denied Sheikh's Motion for Review, concluding that
Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose,
but by the employer's staffing needs, and that Sheikh was not
constructively discharged because she did not take advantage of
opportunities to modify the schedule and the schedule would have
been resolved within a few weeks. (Order Denying Motion for Review,
-25-

hereinafter "Review Order", p. 2) As more fully explained below,
the Commission based it's action on two determinations, that is no
discriminatory purpose and no constructive discharge, and these
determinations are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record taken as a whole.
A.

DISCRIMINATION
As discussed in Point I. supra, if the employer articulates

legitimate reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the
employee

to

show

that

the

reasons

are

a mere

pretext

for

discrimination. See Bowen, supra; McDonnell Douglas, supra; Nulf,
supra.

In Sheikh'scase, the employer did articulate seemingly

legitimate reasons for the onerous schedule given to Sheikh upon
her return from maternity leave. The employer claimed that it had
a new employee who was training and this created special scheduling
problems.

(ALJ Order, Finding No. 12, p. 3-4) The State explained

that the swing shift is the only shift on which a newly hired,
unexperienced person can train because double coverage is needed,
that a three week rotational schedule had been set up in February
of 1990, that Sheikh had been scheduled for the swing shift upon
her return from maternity leave, that the normal practice during a
training period, was to rotate down to the next shift the person
who would normally be scheduled for the swing shift and that just
happened to be Sheikh.

While this explanation on its face makes

sense, it does not make any common sense whatsoever when viewed in
light of the other substantial
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evidence

in the case which,

apparently, the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission failed
to consider.
The explanation simply does not make sense for the following
reasons.

Russell, the newly hired person, began training in mid-

April 1990 while Sheikh was on maternity leave.

She continued to

train for at least one or two weeks after Sheikh's last day on the
job, May 24, 1990.

During the time that Sheikh was on leave and

Russell was training,

there was a shortage of personnel.

The

"rotational schedule" that had been established in February and ran
through May, placed Sheikh on the swing shift, but Russell was
placed on the swing shift because of her training situation. Thus,
Russell was on the swing shift in training for at least two weeks
prior to Sheikh's return and at least one week after Sheikh left
the job on May 24, 1990.

During the time that Russell was in

training prior to Sheikh's return, not a single dispatcher was
scheduled to work the erratic and onerous type of schedule for
which Sheikh was scheduled upon her return.

During at least the

four working days subsequent to Sheikh's last day on the job, not
a single person was scheduled for the type of schedule with the
erratic changes for which Sheikh had been scheduled.

There is not

one piece of evidence either in the documents or in all of the
testimony

at the hearing that

explains why, under virtually

identical circumstances and possibly even worse circumstances than
before Sheikh returned, no one was given the schedule that Sheikh
was given upon her return.

The State continually claimed at the

hearing that the aberrant schedule given to Sheikh was solely due
-27-

to the training of Russell yet never once in the entire hearing was
it explained why no one else was given that schedule under
virtually identical circumstances prior to Sheikh's return and
subsequent to Sheikh's termination when Russell was in training.
When asked to explain it, Nancy Allred could not.
Other evidence in the record demonstrates that the articulated
reason of training Russell and the existence of a rotating schedule
were mere pre-text and not legitimate reasons. The State testified
that all dispatchers had to work erratic schedules from time to
time and pointed to "short change" or "double-back" shifts worked
by employees in the past.4

The State testified that between

December 23, 1989 and May 29, 1990 (approximately a 5 month period)
that Marty had worked 4 double-backs, Lisa had worked 2 doublebacks, Patty had worked 1 double-back, Leah had worked 4 doublebacks, John had worked 1 double-back, Russell had worked 1 doubleback, Diane had worked 2 double-backs and Sandra had worked no
double-backs.

The State admitted, however, that these double-

backs were over a 5 month period, not a three week period, that
these

people

had

not

been

ore-scheduled

for

the

short

change/double-backs, rather they were the result of people calling
in sick, going on vacation and other unplanned events.

Further,

the State acknowledged that major changes of shifts, eg. afternoons
to graveyard, needed 3 days off in between to adjust, and that it
was preferable to work the same shift for 3 weeks prior to

4
As seen by and the schedule as set forth in ALJ Order, Finding No. 12, p. 3, and Fact No. 21)
Sheikh's schedule upon her return included a double-back each of 3 weeks and 3 and major shift changes within
each of the 3 weeks.
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switching

to another

shift.

Sheikh's erratic

and

onerous

schedule, including short-changes and major shift changes, was prescheduled and pre-planned for Sheikh upon her return from maternity
leave, whereas other persons who had worked short-changes were
never pre-planned, rather they were the result of last minute
changes necessitated under the circumstances and were spread over
a considerable period of time.

The State could not explain why in

the two-year period from 1989 to 1990 no one was scheduled except
Sheikh for such an onerous schedule even though during the period
prior to Sheikh's return and after her termination, the same
shortage of manpower existed and Russell was training.
also tried

to explain

its failure to use A.J.'s

The State
(part-time

personnel) to alleviate the onerous schedule given to Sheikh and to
accommodate the training of Russell. As set forth in Finding No.
8 of the ALJ Order, the State explained that A.J.'s could be used
to cover shifts only if full-time personnel were first used and
that there was a limited budget for A.J.'s

The State admitted,

however, that prior to Sheikh's return, A.J. 's were used to fill in
the gaps rather than requiring any employee to work the type of
schedule for which Sheikh was scheduled and that A.J.'s were used
after Sheikh's termination to alleviate the problem of someone
having to work the type of schedule for which Sheikh had been
scheduled upon her return.

There is no explanation as to why

A.J.'s could be used prior to Sheikh's return while Russell was
training and after Sheikh's termination, but not during the time
after Sheikh had returned. The State also admitted that no effort
-29-

was made to determine whether the budget would allow the use of
A.J.'s for the three-week onerous schedule on which Sheikh was
placed upon her return from maternity leave, and that A.J.'s were
not even considered to ameliorate the Sheikh Schedule.

The only

factor which distinguishes the situation during Russell's training
prior to Sheikh's return and after Sheikh's termination is the fact
that Sheikh returned from maternity leave.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that there was no
indication in the testimony that the State ever singled out Sheikh
simply because she was pregnant or had been pregnant.
p. 6)

(ALJ Order,

The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission ignored

other pertinent

testimony

in the record.

The

second

level

supervisor, Nancy Allred testified that her job was very stressful,
that

there

was

a

shortage

of

qualified

people

to

work

as

dispatchers in the vicinity, and that anytime someone took vacation
or

leave or

problems.

called

in sick

it created

difficult

scheduling

She testified (and Sheikh had heard her complaining on

various occasions) that it is more difficult to deal with women who
have small children because they are not as available to come in on
short notice and various other reasons. Sheikh testified that she
had initially given notice of the fact that she was pregnant and
the date upon which she would commence her maternity leave and then
subsequently she learned that her due date had changed and she had
to give another notice changing the date upon which she wanted to
commence maternity leave.

She testified that Nancy Allred became

visibly upset at the change and indicated that it was causing her,
-30-

(Allred) more trouble and stress because of having to do more
scheduling.

Allred testified that she had scheduled a number of

people for maternity leave and that Sheikh's taking maternity leave
was not something that she had not handled before;

however, upon

further examination by Sheikh's counsel, Allred admitted that she
had never scheduled anyone except Shook for maternity leave.
Scheduling Shook was not of the degree of difficulty and did not
create the problems for Allred that other regular dispatcher's
leave would create because Shook was the only person other than
Allred who had a "fixed" schedule, that is she worked the same
hours every day and did not rotate.

Therefore, the scheduling of

Shook was not necessarily a difficult task because of Shook's fixed
schedule; on the contrary, the scheduling of a regular dispatcher
who worked different

shifts and rotated such as Sheikh, was

difficult.
Thus,
difficult

Sheikhs maternity leave was a new, different and
experience

for Allred.

Scheduling dispatchers was

already a very difficult and stressful task. Sheikh not only took
maternity leave but changed the date for her requested leave and
caused additional scheduling changes for Allred. This certainly is
a significant indication of some motive to let Sheikh stay on a
miserable schedule since Sheikh had made scheduling difficult for
Allred and Shook, a task already very stressful.
The Administrative Law Judge, in Finding No. 21, stated that
the policy which Sheikh signed and of which she was aware was that
employees would have to arrange for short-notice child care and
-31-

that the policy had been written in gender neutral terms and there
was no indication that it was applied in a discriminatory fashion.
This conclusion, that it was not applied in a discriminatory
fashion, defies reason and is totally contrary to the evidence.
Each of the employees were under the same policy but no explanation
was given as to why Sheikh was treated in such a disparate manner
under the same policy and same circumstances.
The Administrative Law Judge seemed to find as pertinent to
its conclusion that it was Shook, the shift supervisor who had made
out the schedule for Sheikh and there was no evidence that it was
made at the direction of Nancy Allred. This is totally immaterial.
It makes no difference who made the schedule.
immediate
scheduling.

supervisor,

and

Allred

had

Allred was Shook's

ultimate

authority

in

If, as claimed by Allred, Shook really did make the

schedule, Allred was aware of it and had the power to change it.
It is conceivable that Shook was as irritated by the need to
schedule around a regular dispatcher's maternity leave, especially
one who had changed her expected date for maternity leave, as
Allred would have been. The fact is that Sheikh and Sheikh alone,
following return from maternity leave, was given a schedule that no
one had ever been given before and no one was given at least for
the first week following Sheikh's termination and possibly forever
after that.
In conclusion, there was no evidence whatsoever to explain
why, when Russell was in training before Sheikh's return and after
she left, Sheikh was the only dispatcher ever given that particular
-32-

schedule.

In this case it is not a matter of whether there is

substantial evidence, there is absolutely no evidence to explain
why the schedule only operated while Sheikh was there and not
during the prior or subsequent weeks that Russell was training.
B.

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
The Administrative Law Judge concluding that Sheikh Schedule

11

. . • although difficult was not intolerable."

The Commission

adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and also
concluded that Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to
modify her schedule and that the schedule would have been resolved
within a few weeks had she waited through the rotational process.

These conclusions by the Administrative Law Judge and the
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence when the
record is viewed as a whole; in fact, they are not substantiated by
virtually any evidence whatsoever. As explained in Point I supra,
both

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

and

the

Commission

also

misinterpreted the law and stopped short of a complete application.
The standard, as explained above, is whether a reasonable person
would find this schedule intolerable.

The law also requires the

employer to at least give some assurances that the intolerable
aspects would be changed and requires that the employee must at
least give a fair chance to the employer to make such adjustments.
Garner, supra.
In regard to whether the schedule was "intolerable", neither
the Commission nor the Administrative Law Judge made any findings
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whatsoever to support the conclusion that it was not intolerable.
The Administrative Law Judge found that John Kelly, a fellow
dispatch employee who had been a dispatcher for 2 1/2 years thought
it was a rigorous schedule but that he would not have been
surprised to receive it and he would have worked it, and the
Administrative Law Judge determined that scheduling conditions in
the dispatch office were generally erroneous.
No. 13, p. 4)

(ALJ Order, Fining

That is certainly not "substantial evidence" that

the schedule was not "intolerable". John Kelly can speculate, but
he was never asked to work it.

Sheikh, a good employee of 10

years, found it intolerable and was unable to do so.

In fact, it

flies in the face of the abundance of evidence to the contrary. No
finding was made that Sheikh was not a "reasonable person" or that
John Kelly was somehow more "reasonable" in judging whether the
schedule was intolerable. Sheikh was the only one asked to work it
and who attempted

to do so.

Sheikh testified

that

it was

intolerable and that she physically and mentally and emotionally
could not work the schedule.

It was impossible to get a sleep

cycle, eating routine or spend time with her family;

also, it

created great stress due to concern she would not be functioning as
she should and would endanger the officers lives.

The evidence

shows that Shook called Sheikh to tell her about the schedule and
told her she had "bad" news and Shook testified that she would not
want to work it. This "bad" schedule obviously was something of an
aberration

even in a dispatch office where generally onerous

conditions existed.

If the schedule/conditions were generally
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onerous, by definition, a schedule like Sheikhs was "intolerable".
Just prior to February, 1990, the schedule which had been a 2 week
rotational was changed to the 3 week rotational, because employees
need a set shift for 3 weeks to adjust to new a new shift; 3 days
off were scheduled between shift changes to allow the adjustment
and no short-changes were scheduled. The Sheikh Schedule contained
3 shift changes per week, and a short-change per week.
undisputed

that

this

type

of

a

schedule

had

never

It is
been

intentionally pre-scheduled for anyone and that the major shift
changes and short-changes which were pre-scheduled for Sheikh only
occurred otherwise periodically in an unexpected situation (not 3
weeks running) and would never be deliberately scheduled.
In finding that Sheikh was not constructively discharged, the
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission apparently took into
consideration the contradicted and refuted testimony of Shook and
Allred that Sheikh made no request to do anything about changing
the schedule until May 10, 1990 and the testimony by Shook that
Sheikh did not tell her that she could not or would not work the
assigned schedule.

The implication is that neither Shook nor

Allred had any idea that Sheikh was unhappy about the schedule.
That defies common sense. Even Shook admitted that when she called
Sheikh to tell her of the schedule just before Sheikh's return to
work she told Sheikh she was not going to like it and it was "bad"
news.

Obviously, Shook knew that no one, including Sheikh, would

find the schedule acceptable.

But more importantly, the fact is

that by at least May 10, 1990, the day Sheikh gave notice, both
-35-

Shook and Allred knew that Sheikh intended to quit because of the
schedule.

There is no evidence whatsoever that either Shook or

Allred made any effort to assure Sheikh that adjustments would be
made, and/or that she would go off of the schedule on May 24, 1990
and would be given a reasonable and standard schedule in the
rotational process, and neither made any attempt to ask Sheikh to
remain with the Department.
This action/inaction by Shook and Allred not only clearly
demonstrates

the

intent

to

discriminate

against

Sheikh

but

demonstrates that the Judges conclusions that Sheikh was not
constructively

discharged

are

simply

erroneous

and

are

not

supported by substantial evidence.

The Court in the Garner case

implicitly

to give some assurances or

required

the employer

actually attempt to ameliorate the intolerable situation.

It is

inconceivable that given the difficulty in finding qualified people
in the Price area and the stress of working short-handed and
without adequate manpower, that Allred and Shook would stand by
without saying a word, without making any efforts to remedy the
problem, without asking Sheikh to stay on, without any action
whatsoever, and watch a gooH employee of over ten years leave the
department, unless that is exactly what they wanted.

Shook had no

explanation for the inaction except when asked why, she said "I
don't know."
Court

Furthermore, as set forth in the Garner case, the

expects the employee to give the employer

at least a

reasonable chance to alleviate the intolerable aspects of the
situation.

Sheikh gave two weeks notice. The State had two weeks
-36-

to make some attempt to give assurances or talk to Sheikh or
ameliorate the problem. Thus, Sheikh did act reasonably and within
the requirements of the law of constructive discharge.

The

Administrative Law Judge and the Commission also determined that
Sheikh did not take advantage of self-help opportunities, that is,
to ask other dispatchers to trade shifts with her.

(ALJ Order,

Finding No. 18; Review Order, p. 2) Again, there is no requirement
under the law of constructive discharge that the employee attempt
to circumvent the intolerable situation complained of and created
by the employer by such type of action. There is no evidence, much
less "substantial evidence" in the record to indicate that it would
have

been

possible

sufficiently

to

trade

to alleviate

shifts

with

the intolerable

another

employee

schedule.

Sheikh

testified that she had been informed that it was contrary to
department policy to trade shifts without the consent

of a

supervisor and was under the impression that she was not allowed to
try to do so. Thus, there is certainly not "substantial evidence"
that

Sheikh

could

have

traded

shifts,

because

there

is

diametrically opposed testimony on the issue of whether it was
allowed, and there is no testimony to indicate that others would
have been willing to trade or a trade would have been sufficient to
adequately alleviate the intolerable schedule.
The Administrative Law Judge and the Commission both concluded
that the schedule would have resolved itself within a few weeks had
Sheikh waited for the next "rotation11. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 19,
p. 5; Review Order, p. 2) The proposition that Sheikh could have
-37-

expected the schedule to be resolved due to "normal" rotation
within a few weeks is absurd.
evidence

supporting

the proposition,

evidence supporting it.
Administrative

Law

It not only lacks substantial
it

lacks virtually

any

The rotation schedule to which the

Judge and

apparently

referring was created in February of 1990.

the

Commission

were

The idea was that each

shift would rotate down to the next shift after three weeks;
however, the entire transcript is replete with evidence that there
had never been a schedule that Allred could remember that had ever
worked as planned and that there were always changes.

In fact

under the pre-planned schedule created in February, Sheikh was to
have worked the swing shift for three weeks upon her return;
however, just prior to Sheikh returning to work, she was informed
of a radical difference, in fact she was informed that she would be
working the schedule of which she has complained and which she
found intolerable.

Thus the conclusion by the Administrative Law

Judge and the Commission that she would have rotated out of it is
simply without any basis in.fact.

She could no more anticipate

that after May 24, 1990 she would rotate out of the onerous
schedule she was in than she could have anticipated in February
that she would have been placed in that onerous schedule when she
was scheduled for a swing shift for three weeks.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Sheikh "....was aware
of this rotation...." Sheikh has testified that she did understand
rotation; she had "rotated" for years before and never refused a
particular shift; but given the Sheikh Schedule instead of the
-38-

swing originally scheduled.

She did not know what, if any change

would occur after May 24, 1990. Neither Allred or Shook told her
the schedule would change or what her schedule would be. Yes, she
knew the concept was a rotation one, but it certainly had not
worked as expected on her return from leave;

for that matter,

according to Allred the schedules had never worked as planned.
Nancy also was unable to say what schedule Sheikh would have worked
had she stayed after May 24, 1990.

Thus, if Allred could not

determine what Sheikh would have worked after May 24, 1990, Sheikh
certainly could not make such a determination.

Allred also

admitted even she could not say what Sheikh's schedule would have
been after May 24, 1990. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 20, p. 5) Sheikh
testified that she knew of the pre-planned schedule wherein she
would be working the swing shift and she was aware that the concept
was to rotate every three weeks. She was not aware that she would
be placed in a schedule which no one else ever had before; and she
had no way of knowing whether she was still going to be treated in
a disparate and discriminatory fashion after May 24, 1990, but
believed she would be.

She felt that she was being punished or

"paid back" for having taken maternity leave, changing her dates
for maternity leave, and making life generally difficult for Shook
and Allred.

The fact that neither Shook nor Allred gave any

assurances nor did they make any efforts to talk to Sheikh about
staying with the department or make any effort to ameliorate the
onerous schedule reinforced that belief.
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The Administrative

Law Judge also

seemed

to

find

some

materiality in the fact that Sheikh called in sick several times
during the three-week period and did not actually work the shortchanges and some of the major changes. (ALJ Order, Finding No. 16,
p. 4)

The Administrative Law Judge also found that she called in

sick "...even though she was not.11

(ALJ Order, Finding No. 18, p.

5) This finding that she called in sick even though she was not is
shocking.

There is not one bit of evidence that she was not sick

when she called in sick.

Sheikh testified that she could not

tolerate the massive shift changes and double-backs physically,
mentally or emotionally and was simply unable to work them. There
was no testimony to the contrary that she was actually not sick and
unable to work the schedule.

It is not a matter of whether there

was substantial evidence, there was no evidence that she was not
sick. The fact that she did not work the schedule does not change
the discrimination and the constructive discharge of the situation.
The very fact that she was unable to work the shift itself
demonstrates the intolerability of the schedule and the fact that
she was constructively discharged.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's Order affirming the Administrative Law Judge
Decision in denying Sheikh's Motion for Review was entered based on
an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and was
based upon determinations of fact not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record.
this

Court

should

remand

Accordingly,

the matter to the Commission with
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directions to enter an order granting Sheikh's Motion for Review
and ordering Sheikh's reinstatement and to make findings and
conclusions on the amount of money owed to her, ie, determining the
back pay from the date of her constructive discharge on May 24,
1990 plus interest at 10% per annum and to obtain affidavits of
costs and attorney's fees and calculate that amount into the total
judgment in favor of Sheikh and enter judgment in favor of Sheikh
against the State accordingly.
Respectively submitted this

Slfr day of February, 1995.
Po
MCDONALD & WES^

y

izanney
'Attorp^ysf for P e t i t i o n e r
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the &/1

day of February, 1995 I

caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant and attached
Addenda to the following named persons:
Stephen G. Schwendiman
Utah Attorney General's Office
4120 State Office Building, 4th Fl.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0811
Sharon J. Eblen
Attorneys for Industrial Commission
Industrial Commission of Utah
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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Trial Exhibit f,B" Order Denying Motion for Review, dated
August 25, 1994.
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INDUSTRIAL OOKMXOOICM

OF UTJVK

Case NO. UADD NO. 90-0467
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413
SANDRA SHEIKH;
Charging Party,
vs.
STATE OP UTAH / UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

if

Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * * *

it

* * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 south, salt Lake city, Utah on August
27, 1993, at 8»30 o'clock A.m.
R*\A hAAring
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A, Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

ADDEAJPLMJOEC t

TKo CKtr^iwg P*>»t:y, C*n£k»* CHeikh, \s%tt ^oeent *tn<l
represented by Suzanne West, Attorney at Law,
The respondent employer, State of Utah Department
of Public Safety, was represented by Stephen G.
Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General,

This case involves a claim of sex discrimination because of
pregnancy and maternity leave and the Charging Party requests that
she be reinstated to her position, that she receive back pay from
the claimed time of constructive discharge at a salary level biweekly of $638.40 plus 10% interest per year on the salary, and in
addition, reasonable attorney's fees,
FIHDIHOS or FACTt
1. The Charging Party, Sandra Sheikh, was earning $638.40 biamount of $186.36 bi-weekly.
2. The Charging Party had boon given credit for working for
the state government (Department of Public Safety) of approximately
ten and one-half years at the time vf e*ll«y«<3 Lun»liu^tiv«

discharge.
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3. While there are positive aspects to the radio dispatcher
position which was held by the Charging Party, the negative aspects
of the position were shown to be, among others, that it was an
extremely stressful position requiring frequent rotation into
different shifts including graveyard, and what are called Mshort
change41 *hift». There are no more than eignt nours rest between
such "short change11 shifts. In addition, the evidence shows that
a dispatcher may not be able to leave his/her worksite without
proper coverage; may be unable to schedule hio/her own breaks/ way
h*VA

1<*n<f*H

r\ppo*r*:uni*y

to

oooialioo

with

oo w*irkei.-o

dui-iii^

cover shifts on short notice; may be required to work weekends on
a regular basis; may be unable Lu uhoope the days ott or enirtc;

may have to work split days off during a work week; may have to
IMTOOUJTfli

Child

CAVA

»•».

<-*^~

W«-»\*j-'o

rvo4: xc?*

«t*>yt.itn*

^«y

«>ar n i ^ h t /

may

have to get child oarc for weekends, holidays, and the middle of
the night on a regular basis; may have to be prepared to work

immediately when his/her shift begins; and may have to cancel days
Off

or

holiday

requirements,

may

oituationc

tho

on

plane

on

have
radio

to

short

handle

involving

notice.

Also

life

threatening

polivc

cu-*U

CIIIOL

among

other

emergency

^OV^IQ

wUllt?

maintaining a calm professional demeanor; must answer and respond
to calls for ambulance or paramedics and be able to help the person
by giving instructions.
4. On October 26, 198 9, the Charging Party acknowledged by
signature that she had read and considered three pages of factors
such as those heretofore mentioned*
5. Prior to the consolidation of county and state dispatch
functions in 1988, the Charging Party worked for the county
sheriff's office. In 1988, after the consolidation of services,
various dispatch organizations were combined into a state
organization under the Utah Department of Public Safety.
6. After consolidation, a fixed schedule for dispatchers was
attempted based on seniority. The Charging Party probably had the
most or the second most seniority. The fived system of scheduling
wa» c;nanyeu u«udu«y junior employees never got weeKends Otr, and

were often relegated to working graveyard shifts. During a normal
week, there were often daily changes to the schedule due to
sickness and other requirements, such as vacation, compensatory
tima and unexpected emergencies in the staff's personal life. When
a member of the shift called in sick,- another member was normally
asked to come in. The routine to cover the unscheduled events was
that an earlier shift would be transferred to the later shift. For
example, the 3 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift would be transferred to the
11*66 p.?n»

*.o ?tOO *.m.

•hi£t; in t-ho evont t h e

p.m. shift was unable to come to work.

0*00 p.m.

tw

11*00
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7. Lisa Shook and Nancy Allred worked fixed shifts only since
they were supervisory personnel.
8.
If money was available within certain personnel
constraints, part-timers known as MA.J.fl personnel could be used to
cover the shifts, but only if full-time personnel were first used*
9. The evidence shows that the Price dispatch office had
little or no personnel resource slack and in the event that one or
more people called in unavailable for duty there was a scheduling
problem created.
10. The Charging Party became pregnant sometime in 1989 and
her delivery date was established as March 8, . 1990. She duly
requested maternity leave and Lisa Shook, shift supervisor, was
informed in September 1989. Lisa Shook we^s also pregnant at the
time. The dispatchers often complained about the schedules and as
a result, John Kelly, a dispatcher, came up with a "better11 system
of scheduling. That system was later adopted by a second level
supervisor, Nancy Allred.
This new schedule was completed and
implemented with the modification to allow a three week rotational
period rather than the two week rotation, after the employees felt
that two weeks was insufficient time to adjust to shift changes.
11. The Charging Party left her position to take maternity
leave effective March 4, 1990 at which time she was under the
impression that she would be returning to work on a swing shift on
May 5, 1990. However, she returned on May 4, 1990.
12. A few days prior to her return, the Charging Party was
called by Lisa Shook, the first level supervisor, who informed her
(the Charging Party) that she would return to work on the following
schedule:
Friday, May 4, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (CPR
Training), and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Saturday, May 5, 1990 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 6, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m.; Monday, May 7, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight; Tuesday,
May 8, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 9, 1990 - off; Thursday, May 10,
1990 - noon to 8:00 p.m.; Friday, May 11, 1990 - 3:00 p.m. to 11:30
p.m.; Saturday, May 12, 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May
13/ 1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 14, 1990 - 4:00
p.m. to midnight; Tuesday, May 15, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 16,
1990 - off; Thursday, May 17, 1990'- 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.;
Friday, May 18, 1990 - 9:00 a.m. to 5:Q0 p.m.; Saturday, May 19,
1990 - 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.; Sunday, May 20, 1990 - 11:00 p.m.
to 7:00 a.m.; Monday, May 21, 1990 - 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.;
Tuesday, May 22, 1990 - off; Wednesday, May 23, 1990 - off;
Thursday, May 24, 1990 - 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. This schedule
resulted because, among other problems, a trainee by the name of
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Russell was hired and trainees created special scheduling problems
since they could not be alone during a six to eight week training
period.
13. This schedule was admittedly difficult, but the evidence
shows that the scheduling conditions in the dispatch office were
general onerous. John Kelly, a fellow dispatch employee, testified
that although it was a rigorous schedule, he would not have been
surprised to have received it, and he would have worked it.
14. Although the Charging Party felt that the schedule was
made as "punishment", neither at the time of Me. Shook's telephone
call nor thereafter did the Charging Party tell Ms. Shook that she
could not or would not work the assigned schedule. Because Ms.
Shook knew that the schedule was difficult, she.made an offer to
the Charging Party that the Charging Party could work graveyard in
order to avoid the double back or short change schedule.
15. The second level supervisor, Nancy Allred, was not aware
that the Charging Party was unhappy about the schedule until May
10, 1990. The Charging Party made no request to do anything about
the schedule until May 10th on which date she asked for either job
sharing or a fixed schedule. There was no job sharing authorized
in the Utah dispatch function during this time period. Ms. Allred
told the Charging Party that she oould ask others to trade and that
could be done without an okay from Ms. Allred. Trading shifts was
established routine in the dispatch office, and no advance
supervisory approval was required. There was no evidence that the
Charging Party attempted to ask others to trade shifts.
16. The Charging Party did not work any other of the short
change shifts. She did work the graveyard shift on May 4, 5, and
6th, but did not work that shift on May 10, 12, 13, 19 or the 20th.
She did not work on May 7th, rather she took time off without pay
for seven hours and took one hour of vacation leave. On Tuesday
and Wednesday, May 8th and 9th, respectively, she had no scheduled
shifts. On May 10th she worked from 1200 to 2000 hours. On May
llth, she worked from 1500 to 2330 hours. On Saturday and Sunday
May 12th and 13th, she called in sick. She worked on Monday from
1600 to 2400, She was off on Tuesday and Wednesday, on Thursday,
she worked from 0800 until 1600, and on Friday, May 18th, she
worked from 0900 to 1700 hours. On the 19th and 20th the charging
Party was off without pay. On May 21, 1990, 6he worked from 1600
to 0100 hours. She was off on May 22nd and 23d; on May 24th she
worked from 0800 until 1600 and after that point she did not work
since she had voluntarily resigned on May 10, 1990, and gave the
respondent a two week notioe.
17.

Although there was evidence that the charging Party had
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been dissatisfied with her job as a dispatcher ever since the job
had been consolidated into a state operation, there was no evidence
that the dissatisfaction resulted from any illegal discrimination
against any employee prior to the allegations of this current
complaint•
18, There was no indication that the Charging Party took
advantage of the opportunity to request that other employees
substitute for her in this admittedly difficult work schedule. The
Charging Party did use self help measures to take herself out of
this schedule by calling in sick even though she was not- There
was no evidence that any adverse action was taken or was_ being
contemplated as a result of her action. To the contrary, there was
evidence that management considered her to be a good employee.
19, Had the Charging Party waited through the rotation period
of three weeks she would have rotated to the next position since
all employees would rotate through all the various schedules and
the rotation was based on a three week period,
20. The Charging Party was aware of this rotation although
she claimed that no one told her that she would not have to work
this schedule, indefinitely.
21. The Charging Party claims that the evidence which shows
the discriminatory basis against women was indicated by the policy
that employees would have to be on the job and would have to
arrange for short notice child care. In addition, the Charging
Party states that Ms. Allred got upset when she was informed that
the Charging Party was pregnant since the schedule would have to be
modified again. However, Ms. Allred did not make the schedule
which the Charging Party found to be hintolerable•"
Another
pregnant supervisor made the schedule, and there was no evidence
that the schedule was made at the direction of Ms. Allred. This
former condition of employment was known to the Charging Party as
early as 1989 when she signed a document acknowledging this fact.
That document was written in gender neutral terms and there is no
indication that the policy was ever applied in a discriminatory
fashion. The latter evidence, although not corroborated, but even
if believed does not rise to the level of showing motivation for
discrimination since more than eight weeks had passed between the
event and the Charging Party's return to work on the schedule in
question; and since Me. Allred did not make the schedule,
LEGAL DISCUSSION!
A disparate treatment case requires a showing, through direct
or circumstantial evidence, of an intent to discriminate that shows
that the employer was motivated by an improper and discriminatory
purpose in his conduct.
An employee in a disparate treatment
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employment discrimination case has the initial burden to establish
* prima fac^g showing of the employer's discrimination,
Thereafter, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
conduct in question.
If the employer succeeds, the burden of
production shifts back to the employee to show that the reasons
articulated by the employer were mere pretext for discrimination*
Despite the shifting of the burden of production in the disparate
treatment discrimination cases, the burden of persuasion remains
with the Charging Party throughout the case.
In order to establish a prima ..facie, case, the Charging-Party
must show that she was a member of a group protected by UCA § 3 4 35-6; that she was qualified for the job; that she was
constructively discharged, despite her qualifications, and as a
part of the constructive discharge, she must show that a reasonable
person would view the working conditions as intolerable*
The Charging Party was a member of a group protected by UCA
§34-35-6. She applied for and was granted a maternity leave based
on pregnancy during the period in question. There was never any
dispute during the course of the hearing that she was qualified for
her job. The major issue was whether the employer discriminated
against the Charging Party by adverse job action and if so, whether
the conditions were so unreasonable that she was justified in
discharging herself from those conditions.
Although the schedule the Charging Party complains of was
difficult, she failed to take action such as asking others to work
her shifts which was permissible, or to simply wait for the
rotational process to obtain a better work schedule* She did call
in eiok, and took herself out of the more difficult parts of the
schedule* There was no evidence that any adverse action was taken
against her or was even being contemplated* In addition, she had
the means within her control to properly modify the schedule to her
liking by asking other workers to trade shifts, but there was no
evidence that she made any attempt to change the schedule beyond
asking the supervisor to modify it.
There was no indication in testimony at the hearing that the
employer ever singled out the Charging Party simply because she was
pregnant or had been pregnant.
According to testimony, the
Charging Party would have rotated out* of the schedule as all
employees rotate through all the schedules of the shifts with each
employee's schedule being approximately three weeks in length.
The employer articulated legitimate reasons for the schedule
such as the fact that they had at least one and on occasion two
vacancies during the previous several months that training of a new
*«miavee necessitated schedule aberrations and the normal process
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of people being sick. The necessity of changing the schedule was
evident since during the time that the schedule was in operation,
the Charging Party called in sick on a number of occasions during
this period simply because she did not like the schedule, and other
dispatch employees had to substitute for her on short notice.
Although he schedule in question deviated from one of the normal
shifts, the employer satisfactorily explained the aberrations.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1< During the evidentiary hear! « it vos determined that the
Ciargin.. ^arty had barely managed to make a prima facie case.. Upon
retrospect., and considering the total evidence, it is appar nt that
the balance must shift in favor of determining that the employee
failed to make a prl^a, fccle case in this matter• In any event,
assuming tiac the emplc/ee did make a pri^* facie the employer
articulated
ultimate reasons why the Charging Party's schedule
was difficult and theref .*e it is concluded that the Charging Party
cannct prevail.
The employer, the State of Utah, the Ut^h
Department of Public Safety did not discriminate against Sandra
Shiekh because cf her pregnancy, and her work schedule for the
period May 4 through May 24, 1993, although difficult was not
intolerable*
Ms. Shiekh's resignation was therefore not a
constructive discharge. There was therefore no discriminatory or
unfair emplcsfmont practices under UCA Sect. 34-35-6(1) (a) •
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Charging Party, fsndra
Sheikh, has failed to establish a prima facie case in the claim of
discrimination by her employer, the State of Utah, Department of
Public Safety, and thu* that claim should be and is nereby
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FUR ER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing with the Industrial Commission
of Utah within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in
detail tha particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed,
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In
the event a Motion for Review is ti-ely filed, the parties shall
have fifteen (15) days from the date of filing with the Commission,
in which to file a written response with t^e Commission in
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SANDRA SHEIKH,
Charging Party,
vs.

*
*

STATE OF UTAH/UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW
UADD No. 90-0467
EEOC NO. 35C-90-0413

*

Respondent.

*

This matter is before the Industrial Commission of Utah
pursuant to the Motion For Review filed by Sandra Sheikh, seeking
review of an Administrative Law Judge's Order which dismissed Ms,
Sheikh's charge of unlawful discrimination against the State of
Utah's Department of Public Safety.
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §3435-7.1(11) and Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4.A.5.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Sheikh filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination
Division ("UADD") charging that the Utah Department of Public
Safety ("Public Safety") unlawfully discriminated against her
because of pregnancy.
After an investigation, UADD found
reasonable cause to believe "that Ms. Sheikh had been subjected to
unlawful discrimination due to her pregnancy.
Public Safety requested and was granted an evidentiary
hearing.
After a lengthy hearing with several witnesses and
numerous items of documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Sheikh had
failed
to establish
a prima
facie
case of
discrimination. Ms. Sheikh then filed her Motion For Review with
the Commission. In her Motion For Review, Ms. Sheikh argues that
the preponderance of the evidence does not support the ALJ's
findings and that the findings themselves are inadequate.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
decision of the ALJ.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section §34-35-6 of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act sets forth
the "discriminatory or prohibited employment practices" which are
prohibited by the Act:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to . . . discriminate in
matters of . . . conditions of employment against any
person otherwise qualified, because of . . . pregnancy,
childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions,
. . . .
(emphasis added.)
Ms. Sheikh argues that Public Safety assigned her an unusually
difficult work schedule as punishment for taking maternity leave.
However, for the various reasons detailed in his decision, the ALJ
concluded otherwise. The ALJ found, and the Commission agrees,
that Ms.-Sheikh's schedule was not motivated by a discriminatory
purpose, but by the employer's staffing needs. Furthermore, Ms.
Sheikh did not take advantage of opportunities to modify the
schedule.
Finally, the staffing problems that caused the
difficulties with Ms. Sheikh's schedule would have been resolved
within a few weeks.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Ms. Sheikh's
Motion For Review and affirms the ALJ's decision.
It is so
ordered.
Dated this-J4>^'day of August, 1994

Stephen M. Hadley

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
IMPORTANT: NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE
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NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20.
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order,
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Sandra Sheikh v.
Department of Public Safety, Case Number 90-04 67, on
August, 1994, to the following:
Suzanne West, Attorney
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
455 E. 500 S.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

prepaid first
ORDER DENYING
State-of Utah
theo7j3££day of

Stephen Schwendiman, Attorney
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
4120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Diane Kearns
Industrial Commission of Utah

ah\90-0467oA

